Tentative Rulings for March 27, 2025
Department 503

For any matter where an oral argument is requested and any party to the hearing desires a remote appearance, such request must be timely submitted to and approved by the hearing judge. In this department, the remote appearance will be conducted through Zoom. If approved, please provide the department's clerk a correct email address. (CRC 3.672, Fresno Sup.C. Local Rule 1.1.19)

There are no tentative rulings for the following cases. The hearing will go forward on these matters. If a person is under a court order to appear, he/she must do so. Otherwise, parties should appear unless they have notified the court that they will submit the matter without an appearance. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(c).) ***The above rule also applies to cases listed in this "must appear" section.***

23CECG04440 ***Jesse Cobain v. Walmart, Inc*. (Dept. 503)**

24CECG03040 ***Jilin He v. Putnam Leasing Company I, LLC* (Dept. 503)**

24CECG04948 ***Jason Shepard v. Marissa Cisneros* (Dept.503)**
***** Please refer to the tentative ruling posted below.**
Kevin G. Little only must appear. ***

The court has continued the following cases. The deadlines for opposition and reply papers will remain the same as for the original hearing date.

(Tentative Rulings begin at the next page)

Tentative Rulings for Department 503

Begin at the next page

(46)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Carlos Guerra Tellez v. Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc.***
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03093

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: by Plaintiff Carlos G. Guerra Tellez for Orders Compelling Both Defendants Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc. and Eric Cecilio Arredondo to Each Provide Initial Verified Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; Demand for Inspection of Documents, Set One; and Imposing Monetary Sanctions.

Tentative Ruling:

To grant Plaintiff Carlos G. Guerra Tellez's motions to compel initial responses to form and special interrogatories, and demand for inspection of documents **against defendant Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc**. Within twenty (20) days of service of this order by the clerk, defendant Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc. shall serve objection-free responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Demand for Inspection of Documents, Set One.

To grant Plaintiff Carlos G. Guerra Tellez's motions to compel initial responses to form and special interrogatories, and demand for inspection of documents **against defendant Eric Cecilio Arredondo**. Within twenty (20) days of service of this order by the clerk, defendant Eric Cecilio Arredondo shall serve objection-free responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Demand for Inspection of Documents, Set One.

To grant sanctions **against defendant Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc** in the amount of $880.00, to be paid within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk.

To grant sanctions **against defendant Eric Cecilio Arredondo** in the amount of $880.00, to be paid within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk.

Explanation:

Legal Standard

A propounding party may move for an order compelling response to its propounded interrogatories and/or demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) For a motion to compel initial responses, no meet and confer is required. All that needs to be shown is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (*Leach v. Superior Court* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.) Timely and verified

responses are due from the party on which discovery is propounded within 30 days after service, plus an additional 2 days for service by electronic mail. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260, 2031.260, 1013.) Failing to respond to discovery within the 30-day time limit waives objections to the discovery, including claims of privilege and work product protection. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290 subd. (a), 2031.300 subd. (a).)

Application

Here, plaintiff Carlos G. Guerra Tellez ("plaintiff") served separate sets of discovery on defendants Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc. ("Ace") and Eric Cecilio Arredondo ("Arredondo") (collectively "defendants") via electronic mail on June 20, 2024, each set consisting of (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One; (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One; and (3) Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. (Mancillas Decls., ¶ 4, see also Exhs. A.) The parties agreed to an open extension for defendants to respond pending settlement negotiations. (*Id*., ¶ 7, see also Exhs. D.) As the matter could not be informally settled or resolved, plaintiff advised defendants on November 6, 2024 that they would have 30 days to respond to the propounded discovery. (*Id*., ¶ 11, see also Exhs. H.) Responses were not received by the deadline and have not been received to date. (*Id*., ¶¶ 12, 14.)

Defendants have each had ample time to respond to the discovery propounded by plaintiff and have not done so. Plaintiff filed the instant motions on January 28, 2025. Defendants have not filed opposition to these motions; therefore, the court intends to grant the motions to compel initial verified and objection-free responses from both Ace Farm Labor Contracting, Inc. and Eric Cecilio Arredondo.

Monetary Sanctions

The court may award sanctions against a party that fails to provide discovery responses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The court may award sanctions in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even if no opposition to the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) The court may impose a monetary sanction for misuse of the discovery process, an amount to encompass reasonable expenses (including attorney's fees). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030(a).)

Here, defendants have failed to provide responses to plaintiff's propounded discovery. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions. However, plaintiff's request for sanctions is not reasonable. Plaintiff requests $1,755.00 from each defendant (i.e. $585.00 per motion against each individual defendant).

The motions against each defendant are straightforward and without issue, and arise from the same set of facts. The motions are virtually identical. Thus, it is reasonable to allow for 2 hours of preparation of each set of motion papers, calculated at the attorney's rate of $350.00 per hour. Each defendant will be sanctioned separately in the amount of $880.00 each.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/24/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(34)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Hicks v. Jackson***
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG04303

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: for Judicial Notice and Review of Documents

Tentative Ruling:

To deny the Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibits A, B and C.

To deny the motion for a forensic document investigation.

Explanation:

Defendant and cross-complainant Jerreece Jackson moves the court for an order appointing a forensic document examiner and requesting judicial notice of a notarized signature page dated June 19, 2019 (Exhibit A), the grant deed with notarized signature also dated June 19, 2019 (Exhibit B), and the July 9, 2019 Grant Deed (Exhibit C). Cross-complainant asserts the grant deed notarized June 19, 2019 is fraudulent and created using the notarized signature page from a Secure Note Deed of Trust signed June 19, 2019.

Judicial notice may be taken of the existence and facial contents of recorded real property records where the authenticity of the document is not challenged. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subds. (c) and (h); *Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, fn. 1.)

Here, it appears the fact of the existence of the documents and recordation of the documents is subject to judicial notice but the truthfulness of the contents of Exhibit B and its authenticity are disputed by cross-complainant. Where the truthfulness of a document or its proper interpretation are disputable, it is not a proper subject of judicial notice. (*Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp*. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114.) As such, the court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibit B.

Exhibit A is limited to the second page of the recorded Secure Note Deed of Trust notarized on June 19, 2019. Exhibit C is designated as "Page 3 of 3" in the top right corner. Although the entire document, as a recorded real property record, may be the subject of judicial notice, the court has insufficient information to confirm the document is what cross-defendant purports it to be. The party requesting judicial notice must "[f]urnishe[] the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (b).) As such, the court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibits A and C.

As for the request to order a forensic examination of the documents at issue, the moving party has not presented authority for the court to make such an order. Cross-

complainant may engage the services of experts she deems necessary to further her claims. The court notes that with a trial date of May 12, 2025, it appears the time to exchange expert witness information for trial has passed. (Code CIv. Proc. § 2034.230, subd. (b).)

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/24/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(46)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Misael Espinoza Perez v. Saber Liquor Market***
Superior Court Case No. 24CECG01384

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: by Defendants Saber Liquor Market and Ashish Bhyan to Strike Portions of Complaint

Tentative Ruling:

To continue this motion to Thursday, May 1, 2025, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 503. The parties are ordered to conduct a meet and confer session, **in person, by telephone**, **or by video conference** at least 20 days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5 subd. (a).) If the meet and confer resolves the issues, defendants shall call the calendar clerk to take the motions off calendar. If it does not resolve the issues, defendants shall file a declaration, on or before Friday, April 4, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. stating the efforts made.

Explanation:

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion to strike, moving party's counsel must meet and confer, **in person, by video conference, or by telephone** with counsel for the party who filed the pleading in an attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5 subd. (a).) The meet and confer must occur at least 5 days before the date a motion to strike must be filed. (*Id*., subd. (a)(2).) The moving party must file and serve a declaration stating whether the parties met and conferred without reaching an agreement, or whether the responding party failed to respond or meet and confer in good faith. (*Id*., subd. (a)(3).

Here, defendants filed a declaration by their attorney, Christina E. Kim. Defendants state only that "[t]he parties met and conferred" but do not indicate any attempts to meet via telephone, video, or in person, the methods specified in section 435.5 subdivision (a). (Kim Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants attach an e-mail received from plaintiff's counsel's firm on November 18, 2024, which states: "Per Mr. Salhab, after reviewing the issues raised in the meet and confer, there is not an agreement and Mr. Salhab's position is that there are grounds to proceed with seeking punitive damages." (*Id*., ¶ 5, Exh. 1.) Written correspondence alone is insufficient to satisfy the requirement set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5 subdivision (a). The court is unable to reach the merits of the motion to strike unless and until the parties have engaged in telephonic or in-person meet and confer as required.

"A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike." (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5 subd. (a)(4).) The matter will be continued to allow the parties time to meet and confer, prior

to ruling on the merits of the motion. A code-compliant declaration must be filed by the moving party detailing the efforts made and any result thereof.

The court's normal practice in such instances is to take the motion off calendar, subject to being re-calendared once the parties have met and conferred. However, given the current congestion in the court's calendar, the court will instead continue the hearing to allow the parties to meet and confer, and only if efforts are truly unsuccessful will it rule on the merits. After such good faith attempts, defendants shall file a declaration specifically detailing the efforts made.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/24/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(03)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Ansaldo v. Basmajian***
Case No. 23CECG00299

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate Trial

Tentative Ruling:

To deny plaintiff's motion to bifurcate the trial, without prejudice to bringing the motion closer to the trial date.

Explanation:

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 598, the court has great discretion in regard to the order of issues at trial: "The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order…that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case. …" (Code Civ. Proc. § 598.)

Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 specifies the court's discretion in regard to bifurcating issues for separate trial: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action…or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subd. (b).)

The objective of bifurcation is to avoid wasting time and money on the trial of damages issues if the liability issue is resolved against plaintiff. (*Horton v. Jones* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 954.) It also "serves the salutary purpose of avoiding wasting time and money, and prevents possible prejudice to a defendant where a jury might look past liability to compensate a plaintiff through sympathy for his or her damages." (Weil & Brown (The Rutter Group 2017) California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, § 12:414.)

In the present case, plaintiff argues that it would serve the interest of judicial economy to conduct a court trial of the defendant's equitable quiet title cross-claim before conducting a jury trial of the parties' tort claims, which are legal rather than equitable in nature. Plaintiff contends that the resolution of the quiet title claim may resolve the other tort claims without having to conduct a jury trial at all, which would save the parties time and money.

It is true that a quiet title action is considered to be equitable in nature, and that equitable claims are often tried before legal claims. "[I]t is … well established that actions to quiet title, like true declaratory relief actions, are generally equitable in nature." (*Caira v. Offner* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 25, citation omitted.) "It is well established that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable issues first, without a jury (or, as here, with an advisory jury), and that if the court's

determination of those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be tried by a jury." (*Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn.* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671, citations omitted.) "Generally, in mixed actions, the equitable issues should be tried first by the court, either with or without an advisory jury. Trial courts are encouraged to apply this 'equity first' rule because it promotes judicial economy by potentially obviating the need for a jury trial." (*Darbun Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital* (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 399, 408–409, citations omitted.)

"It is well-established in California jurisprudence that '[t]he court may decide the equitable issues first, and this decision may result in factual and legal findings that effectively dispose of the legal claims.' … '[T]he practical reason for this procedure is that the trial of the equitable issues may dispense with the legal issues and end the case.' In short, 'trial of equitable issues first may promote judicial economy.' (*Hoopes v. Dolan* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 157, citations omitted.) In fact, "[t]here are few California cases where legal issues were tried before equitable ones..." (*Ibid*, citations omitted.)

Here, the defendant has raised a quiet title claim regarding the ownership of the disputed parcel, as well as legal claims that allege various torts regarding the relationship between the parties. Plaintiff has also alleged several tort claims against defendant, which are essentially legal in nature, but also center on the issue of the ownership of the disputed parcel and the tree that was located on the parcel. Thus, it may ultimately be desirable to conduct a court trial of the quiet title claim before holding a jury trial on the legal causes of action, especially since the resolution of the dispute over the ownership of the disputed parcel of land and the tree located on it may make a trial of at least some of the tort claims unnecessary and thus save time and money.

On the other hand, it appears that not all of the tort claims will be resolved if the court rules on the quiet title claim first. For example, defendant alleges that plaintiff invaded her privacy by conducting surveillance on her and her property, breached the settlement and release agreement that resolved the prior cases, breached the mutual stay-away agreement, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her by, among other things, harassing and assaulting her. While the court may be able to resolve some of the causes of action by determining whether plaintiff or defendant is the true owner of the disputed parcel and the tree, at least some of the other claims are not likely to be resolved by a ruling on the quiet title claim.

In addition, the trial is still about six months away, and there does not appear to be any pressing need to decide whether to bifurcate the trial at the present time. It would be more reasonable to allow the judge who is ultimately assigned to try the case to rule on the question of whether to bifurcate the trial, rather than attempting to deal with the issue now months before the case is set to be tried. Therefore, the court intends to deny the motion to bifurcate the trial without prejudice.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/24/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(41)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Jason Shepard v. Marissa Cisneros***
Superior Court Case No. 24CECG04948

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: Demurrer by Defendants to Complaint

Plaintiff's counsel, Kevin G. Little, is ordered to appear in person at the hearing and to bring full copies of each cited case. All quoted material cited by Plaintiff must be highlighted.

Tentative Ruling:

To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff is granted leave of 10 days to file a first amended complaint, which shall run from service by the clerk of the minute order. New language must be set in **boldface** type.

Explanation:

The plaintiff, Jason Shepard (Plaintiff), alleges he was falsely accused of domestic violence resulting in his arrest without probable cause. Plaintiff filed a form complaint with two causes of action against the City of Fresno and Fresno police officer Marissa Cisneros (together Defendants). The first cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (the Bane Act); and the second cause of action is for false arrest.

Defendants initially demurred to both causes of action based on the statute of limitations. Defendants also demurred to the first cause of action based on Plaintiff's failure to allege sufficiently any "threat, intimidation or coercion," as required to plead a cause of action under the Bane Act. Plaintiff opposed the demurrer and Defendants filed a reply. In the reply, Defendants withdrew their demurrer based on the statute of limitations, noting the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subd. (e)(4)(E). Defendants' demurrer now is limited to the first cause of action under the Bane Act.

Meet and Confer

Counsel for Defendants filed and served a declaration stating counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff's' counsel by mail, email, and telephone, but the parties were unable to resolve their differences. This satisfies the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 to meet and confer before filing a demurrer.

Demurrer to First Cause of Action

The Bane Act authorizes a civil action against any person who interferes with an individual's constitutional rights "by threat, intimidation, or coercion[.]" (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).) A plaintiff must allege two distinct elements to state a cause of action under

the Bane Act: (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion. (*Allen v. City of Sacramento* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41,67 (*Allen*).)

> The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.

(*Simmons v. Superior Court* (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1125, citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)

Defendants concede Plaintiff's false arrest allegation satisfies the interference element; but contend plaintiff fails to allege the arrest was effectuated by threats, intimidation or coercion. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to make the necessary allegations to state a cause of action under the Bane Act.

In *Allen*, homeless individuals sued the Sacramento police for an allegedly unlawful arrest. The plaintiffs alleged no coercion beyond the coercion inherent in any arrest. The appellate court concluded "a wrongful arrest or detention, without more, does not satisfy both elements of section 52.1. [Citation.]" (*Allen, supra,* 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 69.) "The conclusory allegations of 'forcible' and 'coercive' interference with plaintiffs' constitutional rights are inadequate to state a cause of action for a violation of section 52.1." (*Ibid.*)

Plaintiff makes two attempts to distinguish *Allen.* In response to Plaintiff's first attempt to distinguish *Allen*, because it predates the 2019 amendment of the Bane Act, Defendants point out the amendment made only one change to the statute—it added a new subdivision (a) that states: "This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act." (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).) This amendment made no substantive changes (except each following subdivision was re-lettered). In response to Plaintiff's second attempt to distinguish *Allen*, because the underlying arrests were for different violations, Defendants correctly note this is a distinction without a difference.

Defendants distinguish five other cases cited by Plaintiff, which actually support Defendants' position that the Bane Act requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in an arrest. (*Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [statute requires independent showing of coercion in addition to wrongful arrest]; *Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco* (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 793-794 [arrest carried out with threats of violence and unreasonable force provided "something more" than coercion inherent in all arrests]; *Bender v. County of Los Angeles* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 978, [where arrest is unlawful *and* excessive force is used, there is coercion within the meaning of the Bane Act]; *Simmons v. Superior Court, supra,* 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127 [if additional coercion beyond arrest is required, alleged facts were sufficient additional coercion under Bane Act]; *Lyall v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2015) 807 F3d 1178, 1196 [to recover under Bane Act, plaintiff must allege threats or coercion beyond coercion inherent in detention or search].)

In addition, Plaintiff cites a California Supreme Court case, *Venegas v. County of Los Angeles* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 843, for the proposition that "a wrongful arrest and detention by police officers is a 'threat, intimidation, or coercion' for purposes of the Bane Act." Defendants correctly state "[n]o such quote is found in *Venegas*." The court cannot find other quotations and cases cited in Plaintiff's opposition memorandum. (The court also notes Plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities fails to follow the requirements of the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, in that it exceeds the page limit and lacks the necessary table of contents and table of authorities.)

The court finds Plaintiff fails to allege the necessary threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in Plaintiff's arrest. Therefore, the court sustains Defendants' demurrer to the first cause of action.

Leave to Amend

It is the opposing party's responsibility to request leave to amend, and to show how the pleading can be amended to cure its defects. (*Blank v. Kirwan* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Ordinarily, given the court's liberal policy of amendment, the court will grant leave to amend an original complaint. (See *McDonald v. Superior Court* (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297, 303-304 ["Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule" unless complaint "shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment"].) Plaintiff fails to show how he can amend his pleading to cure its defects. Out of an abundance of caution given the court's liberal policy of amendment, the court grants leave to amend, since this is the first complaint considered by the court.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/25/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(46)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Jon Maciel v. Clovis Unified School District***
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG04414

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim of Minor

Tentative Ruling:

To grant the petition. The court intends to sign the proposed order. No appearances are necessary.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/25/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(24)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***In Re: Mia Ann Zavala***
Superior Court Case No. 22CECG03345

and

In re Christian Zavala
Superior Court Case No. 22CECG03344

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 (Dept. 503)

Motion: Amended Petitions to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claims of Minors

Tentative Ruling:

To grant both petitions, with corrections to the orders.

The court sets a status conference on Thursday, May 29, 2025 at 3:30 p.m. in Department 503 for confirmation of deposit of the minors' funds into separate blocked accounts. If Petitioner files the Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order and Funds for Deposit in Blocked Account (MC-356) for each case at least five court days before the hearing, the status conference hearings will come off calendar.

Explanation:

The court notes that petitioner used the wrong birth date on the petition for Christian Zavala, Jr. (using Mia Ann Zavala's birthdate). However, the orders for Christian had his correct birthdate.

The orders for each minor were corrected because they are not amended orders, just orders on amended petitions. Also, each Order Approving Compromise incorrectly filled out information about the blocked accounts, but the court has corrected this error so as not to delay this matter any longer than it already has been.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 3/25/2025 .
(Judge's initials) (Date)